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Abstract
Banks’ asset fire sales and recourse to central bank credit are modeled with continuous asset
liquidity, allowing us to derive the liability structure of a bank. Both asset sales liquidity and
the central bank collateral framework are modeled as power functions within the unit
interval. Funding stability is captured as a strategic bank run game in pure strategies
between depositors. Fire sale liquidity and the central bank collateral framework determine
jointly the ability of the banking system to deliver maturity transformation without
endangering financial stability. The model also explains why banks tend to use the least
liquid eligible collateral with the central bank and why a sudden unanticipated reduction of
asset liquidity, or a tightening of the collateral framework, can trigger a bank run. The model
also shows that the collateral framework can be understood, beyond its aim to protect the
central bank, as a financial stability and unconventional monetary policy instrument.
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Introduction

The model proposed in this paper sheds new light on how asset liquidity and the central
bank collateral framework affect the liability structure of banks, financial stability, and
monetary policy. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC) is said to also have been
triggered by the insufficient asset liquidity buffers of banks relative to their short-term
liabilities. These insufficient buffers would have led to an (at least temporarily) excessive
reliance on central bank funding (BCBS 2013). The economic trade-offs between the
efficiency of the banking system in delivering maturity transformation and financial stability
is also crucial when assessing the net benefits of regulation for society. In the words of the
Turner Review:
[T]here is a tradeoff to be struck. Increased maturity transformation delivers bene- fits
to the non-bank sectors of the economy and produces term structures of interest rates
more favorable to long-term investment. But the greater the aggregate degree of
maturity transformation, the more the systemic risks and the greater the extent to which
risks can only be offset by the potential for central bank liquidity assistance. (FSA 2009)
Although the central bank collateral framework has drawn relatively limited attention in
academic writing, it is one of the most complex and economically significant elements of
monetary policy implementation (for example, Bindseil, Corsi et al. 2017; Bindseil, Dragu et
al. 2017; Nyborg 2016). Unencumbered central bank eligible collateral is potential liquidity,
as it can, in principle, be swapped into central bank money. It is therefore not an exaggeration
to argue that the collateral framework must be an important ingredient of any theory of
liquidity crises (as noted in Bagehot 1873) and of any monetary theory. The Markets
Committee of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) summarizes various measures
central banks took during the Lehman Brothers crisis:
During the height of the financial crisis in 2008–09, a number of central banks
introduced, to varying degrees, crisis management measures such as a temporary
acceptance of additional types of collateral, a temporary lowering of the minimum rating
requirements of existing eligible collateral or a temporary relaxation of haircut
standards. (BIS Markets Committee 2013, 8–9)
The COVID-19 crisis again led central banks to relax their collateral frameworks, despite the
fact that credit quality of issuers and counterparties did not improve. The European Central
Bank (ECB) announced an “unprecedented” package on April 7, 2020:
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) today adopted a package of
temporary collateral easing measures to facilitate the availability of eligible collateral
for Eurosystem counterparties to participate in liquidity providing operations . . . the
Eurosystem is increasing its risk tolerance to support the provision of credit via its
refinancing operations, particularly by lowering collateral valuation haircuts for all
assets consistently. . . . [T]he Governing Council decided to temporarily increase its risk
tolerance level in credit operations through a general reduction of collateral valuation
haircuts by a fixed factor of 20%. (ECB 2020)
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Three strands of academic literature are relevant to the present paper. First, Rochet and
Vives (2004) is close to the present paper in the sense that it also models the role of fire sales
and the central bank lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) function for banks’ funding stability,
liquidity, and solvency. The model of Rochet and Vives, however, takes strong simplifying
assumptions regarding asset liquidity (only two types of assets are distinguished: cash and
nonliquid assets). Beyond Rochet and Vives, there is an extensive more general multiple
funding equilibrium literature such as represented, for example, by Morris and Shin (2001)
under the headline of “global games.” This literature uses more general and sophisticated
equilibrium concepts than the present paper, which limits itself to pure and dominant
strategies of investors/depositors, and to the existence or not of a strict Nash equilibrium in
the sense of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Again, none of these papers, however, models
explicitly fire sales and the central bank LOLR together, nor do they allow us to derive the
bank’s liability structure from this modeling. Finally, there is a relatively recent bank run
literature integrating bank runs and the LOLR into macroeconomic models, such as Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2015) and De Fiore, Hoerova, and Uhlig (2021). These models are more
ambitious in terms of integrating bank runs in a general equilibrium macro context, but the
modeling of the limits of banks to issue short-term deposits is rather ad hoc (a moral hazard
problem of the bank manager is postulated to limit deposit issuance; namely, bank managers
would be able to divert assets from the bank to enrich themselves personally). In contrast,
in the model proposed here, the bank’s ability to issue short-term deposits follows
endogenously from the threat of a bank run.
Second, Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2010) relates to the present model in the sense
that central bank haircut policies are identified and modeled as a monetary policy
instrument (see also Chapman, Chiu, and Molico 2011). Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen
assumes that banks refinance assets at the central bank and that the haircut determines the
leverage ratio and thus the funding costs of assets, being a weighted average of the risk-free
rate and the shadow cost of equity (see also Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009).
Third, the present paper explains the spread between the risk-free rate (which is close to the
rate of central bank credit operations and the rate of remuneration of overnight deposits of
households with the banking system) and the actual funding costs of the real economy (or
the effective monetary conditions for the economy). In this sense, the paper contributes to
enrich the analysis of monetary policy in particular by capturing more explicitly the spread
between the central bank credit operations rate and the actual monetary conditions as they
are felt by participants in the real economy when seeking bank or market funding. Indeed,
the present paper shows that a drop in bank asset liquidity and/or an increase in central
bank haircuts both tighten effective monetary conditions in the sense that they reduce the
ability of the banking system to undertake maturity transformation, and hence, everything
else equal, will increase the share of “expensive” bank funding sources such as long-term
bonds and equity, implying that also the lending rates that a competitive banking system is
able to offer have to increase.
Empirical evidence of the different degrees of banks’ asset liquidity, focusing on the case of
the euro area, is provided by Bindseil, Dragu et al. (2017). The paper provides a cross-section
analysis of liquidity properties and central bank collateral haircuts of the euro area fixed-
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income universe. That asset liquidity is continuous, and that it fluctuates over time, has been
described empirically in the finance literature, such as recently in Dötz and Weth (2019),
which also argues that liquidation will be carried out in a liquidity pecking order style and
that marginal liquidation costs increase in redemptions (9–11), that is, as assumed in the
present paper. The authors construct a sample of corporate bond fund asset liquidity data
covering the 80 months before June 2016, referring to about 700,000 security holdings
positions (12). The liquidity measure consists of monthly averages of bid-ask spreads. Figure
1 shows continuous portfolio liquidity, put at any moment in time in a “liquidity pecking
order” (that is, securities ranked from the most to the least liquid). Obviously, the least liquid
assets held by a corporate bond fund will still be more liquid than many other bank assets,
such as in particular loan portfolios. Still, Dötz and Weth illustrates the idea of continuous
asset liquidity and the changes of asset liquidity over time.
Figure 1: Liquidity Structure of Corporate Bond Funds across Time

Note: Bid-ask spread in basis points.
Source: Dötz and Weth 2019.

The paper also sheds new light on related debates. For example, first, Acosta-Smith et al.
(2019), which studies the relationship between bank capital and liquidity transformation,
finds that “banks engage in less liquidity transformation when they have higher capital,” but
our paper suggests that there are alternative causalities that could explain this empirical
pattern. Second, the literature on fire sales, as summarized by Shleifer and Vishny (2011),
generally regards fire sales as entailing “systemic risk and significant [negative] externalities
(43). Our paper models potential fire sales as being an integral part of maturity
transformation by banks, whereby indeed, actual fire sales would not materialize in the
absence of negative shocks on asset liquidity or asset values. Third, the present model
provides further insights into empirical phenomena, such as those observed by Boyson,
Helwege, and Jindra (2014), which investigates “which factor, liquidity or solvency, is more
important for financial crisis.” Several further empirical hypotheses supported in that paper
are captured also in our model, and therefore are supported by additional theoretical
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explanations. Finally, the paper also sheds new light on why both liquidity regulation and the
lender of last resort are needed, extending the work of Carlson, Duygan-Bump, and Nelson
(2015), among others.

2.

A Model of Funding Stability with Continuous Asset
Liquidity and Haircuts

Throughout this paper, the following stylized bank balance sheet is assumed, with total
length set to unit. Assets are heterogeneous in a continuous sense, while there are three
types of liabilities that are each separately homogenous equity (e), long-term debt (t), and
short-term deposits held by two depositors (each depositor holding therefore (1 − t − e)/2
short-term deposits), with e, t ≥ 0, e + t ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 2: Stylized Bank Balance Sheet
Assets

Assets

Liabilities

1 Short-term debt 1
(1 – t – e)/2
Short-term debt 2
(1 – t – e)/2
Long-term debt (“term funding”)
t
Equity
e

Source: Created by the authors.

Short-term deposits can be subject to a bank run (Diamond and Dybvig 1983, 15). Banks
could address this by not relying, or at least not extensively relying, on short-term funding.
However, in general, investors prefer to hold short-term debt instruments over long-term
debt instruments, and hence face a higher interest rate on long-term debt. In other words,
long-term debt is associated with higher funding costs for the bank. Banks could also hold
sufficient amounts of liquid assets, both in the sense of being able to liquidate these assets in
case of need and to be able to pledge them with the central bank at limited haircuts. However,
on average, liquid assets generate lower returns than illiquid ones. We next consider in more
detail the different balance sheet positions.
2.1 Bank Assets
Assets are continuous with regard to two liquidity characteristics: (i) Asset liquidity as
measured by the “fire sale” discount to be accepted if an asset is to be sold in the short run;
(ii) valuation haircut if submitted as central bank collateral.
Bank Assets as Central Bank Collateral
Assume that assets are ranked from those the central bank considers will require the lowest
haircuts to those requiring the highest ones. The central bank collateral haircut function is
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set to be from the asset unit interval [0, 1] into the possible haircut unit interval [0, 1].
Assume that it has the following functional form with δ ≥ 0:
ℎ(𝑥) = 𝑥𝛿

(1)

The power function in the unit interval captures broadly the properties of a typical central
bank haircut framework: haircuts for the most liquid assets will be close to zero, while
haircuts for the least liquid assets accepted will be high, and an often-significant part of
assets will not be accepted at all, which is equivalent to a 100% haircut. If δ is close to 0, then
the haircuts increase and converge quickly towards 1. If in contrast δ is large (say 10) then
haircuts stay at close to zero for a while and only start to increase in a convex manner when
approaching the least liquid assets. The total haircut (and the average haircut) if all assets
1
𝛿
are pledged is 𝛿+1
, and hence potential central bank credit is 𝛿+1
. This is obtained from the
1
𝛿
𝛿+1
integration rule 𝒥 𝑥 𝑑𝑥 = 𝛿+1 𝑥 . For example, in the case of the Eurosystem, out of
EUR 30 trillion of aggregated bank assets, the value of central bank eligible collateral after
haircuts that could be used at any moment in time is about EUR 5 trillion. The eligibility
criteria and haircut matrices are provided by the ECB, and one can match this information in
principle with an informed guess of banks’ assets holdings. This implies that the effective
average haircut applied by the Eurosystem to (the entirety of) bank assets is about 83% (EUR
25 trillion/EUR 30 trillion), and central bank refinancing power is about 17% of eligible
assets, which approximately implies, if one assumes a power function as done above, a
parameter value δ = 0.2. ECB (2015, 31) provides an overview of the ECB’s haircut scheme.
Liquidity of Bank Assets
Now consider asset liquidity in the sense of the ability of banks to sell assets in the short
term without this inflicting a loss for the bank. Assume again that assets are ranked from the
most liquid to the least liquid, and that the fire sale discount function is a function from [0,
1] to [0, 1] with the following function form, for Θ ≥ 0:
𝑑(𝑥) = 𝑥 𝛩

(2)

The smaller Θ, the faster fire sale losses increase toward 100% when moving from the most
liquid to the least liquid assets. If a certain share x of the assets has to be sold, then the fire
sale discounts will have to be booked as a loss and reduce equity. Assuming that the bank
1
starts with the most liquid assets, the loss will be Θ+1 𝑥 Θ+1 . Empirical estimates of default
costs in the corporate finance literature vary between 10% and 44% (see, for example,
Davydenko, Strebulaev, and Zhao 2011; and Glover 2016). This cost can be interpreted as
the liquidation cost of assets, captured in the parameter Θ. Liquidation of all assets will lead
to a damage of 1, so the remaining asset value will be Θ. If default cost is 10%, this would
mean that Θ = 9, and if default cost is 44%, then Θ = 1.27. For a value of default costs in the
middle of the empirical estimates of say 25%, one obtains Θ = 3.
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2.2 Bank Liabilities
Four types of liabilities are distinguished: (i) Short-term liabilities are equally split to two ex
ante identical depositors; (ii) Long-term debt does not mature within the period considered
and is ranked pari passu with short-term debt; (iii) Equity is junior to all other liabilities and
cannot flow out either; and (iv) Central bank borrowing is zero initially but can substitute for
outflows of short-term liabilities in case of need. It is collateralized, and therefore the central
bank acquires in case of default ownership of the assets pledged as collateral. Apart from
this, the central bank claim ranks pari passu; that is, remaining claims after collateral
liquidation are treated in the same way as an initial unsecured deposit.
2.3 Timeline
The model is based on the following timeline:
•

Initially, the bank has the balance sheet composition as shown in Figure 1.

•

Short-term depositors/investors play a strategic game with two alternative actions:
to run or not to run. “Running” means to withdraw deposits. If successful, the value
of claims is afterwards equal to the initial value minus a small cost, E, capturing the
transaction cost of withdrawing the deposits.

•

It is not to be taken for granted that depositors can withdraw all their funds. Outflows
need to be funded by the bank in some way: (i) recourse to central bank credit,
assuming that the bank has sufficient eligible collateral; (ii) quick liquidation of assets
(“fire sales”); or (iii) if it is impossible to pay out the depositors that want to withdraw
their deposits, illiquidity-induced default will occur. In such case, all (remaining)
assets need to be liquidated and corresponding default-related losses occur.

•

If the bank is not closed due to illiquidity, still its solvency needs verification after it
undertakes fire sales. If capital is negative, the bank is resolved. Again, it is assumed
in this case that the full costs of immediately liquidating all assets materialize.

2.4 Strict Nash No-Run (SNNR) Equilibrium
The decision set of depositor i (i = 1, 2) from which he will choose his decision Di consists of
{Ki, Ri}, whereby “K” stands for “keeping” deposits and “R” stands for “run.” Let Ui = Ui (D1, D2)
be the payoff function of depositor i. Note that the strategic game is symmetric, that is: U1(K1,
K2) = U2(K1, K2), U1(K1, R2) = U2(R1, K2), U1(R1, K2) = U2(K1, R2), U1(R1, R2) = U2(R1, R2). This
allows us in the rest of the paper to express conditions with reference to only one of the two
players, say depositor 1. A strict Nash equilibrium is defined as a strategic game in which
each player has a unique best response to the other players’ strategies (see Fudenberg and
Tirole 1991). A strict Nash no-run (SNNR) equilibrium in the run game is therefore one in
which the no-run choice dominates the “run” choice regardless of what the other depositors
decide, that is, an SNNR equilibrium is defined by:
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U1(K1, K2) > U1(R1, K2) and U1(K1, R2) > U1(R1, R2)

3.

(3)

Pure Reliance on Either Central Bank Credit or Asset Fire
Sales

3.1 Pure Reliance on Central Bank Funding
Assume first that asset liquidation is not an option, say, because markets are totally frozen,
that is, Θ = 0. In this case, the analysis can focus on the sufficiency or not of buffers for central
bank credit. The following proposition states the necessary condition for funding stability of
banks in this case.
Proposition 3.1. If Θ = 0, and assuming a small transaction cost E of withdrawing
𝛿
1−𝑡−𝑒
deposits, an SNNR equilibrium prevails if and only if 𝛿+1 ≥ 2 , that is, the liquidity
2
buffer based
on recourse to the central bank is not smaller than one-half of the shortterm deposits.
Proof. To prove this result (and similar subsequent propositions), it is sufficient to calculate
through the payoffs for the alternative decisions of depositors under the possible parameter
combinations and establish the frontiers of parameter combinations under which the
conditions of an SNNR equilibrium apply. We now distinguish the three possible cases: (1 −
𝛿
(1−𝑡−𝑒)
𝛿
𝑡 − 𝑒) < 𝛿+1 (which we will denote by (1)), 2 < 𝛿+1 < (1 − 𝑡 − 𝑒) (which we will denote
𝛿

(1−𝑡−𝑒)

by (2)), and 𝛿+1 < 2 (denoted by (3)). These represent, respectively, the cases in which
liquidity buffers provided by central bank collateral are sufficient to compensate for the
withdrawal of all deposits, for the withdrawal of (not more than) one depositor, or for not
even the withdrawal of one depositor. It may be noted that in the case assumed here that Θ
= 0, illiquidity of the bank means complete destruction of asset value as the liquidation value
of assets is assumed to be zero. The proposition follows from verifying the condition U1(K1,
K2) > U1(R1, K2) and U1(K1, R2) > U1(R1, R2) for the three different cases distinguished above.
One obtains the scenarios shown in Figure 3.

84

Fire Sales, the LOLR, and Bank Runs

Bindseil and Lanari

Figure 3: Payoffs of Depositors in Three Cases (see Proof of Proposition 3.1)
Case

U1(K1, K2)

U1(R1, K2)

U1(K1, R2)

U1(R1, R2)

(1)

(1 − 𝑡 − 𝑒)
2

(1 − 𝑡 − 𝑒)
−𝐸
2

(1 − 𝑡 − 𝑒)
2

(1 − 𝑡 − 𝑒)
−𝐸
2

(2)

(1 − 𝑡 − 𝑒)
2

(1 − 𝑡 − 𝑒)
−𝐸
2

(1 − 𝑡 − 𝑒)
2

1 𝛿
2𝛿 + 1

(3)

(1 − 𝑡 − 𝑒)
2

𝛿
𝛿+1

0

1 𝛿
2𝛿 + 1

Source: Authors’ calculations.

It is easily verified that the conditions for an SNNR equilibrium are given if and only if
(1−𝑡−𝑒)
𝛿
< 𝛿+1.
2
3.2 Pure Reliance on Asset Fire Sales
Now consider the case in which the central bank does not offer any credit to banks, that is,
accepts no collateral at all. In this case, δ = 0, such that addressing deposit outflows will have
to rely exclusively on asset liquidation. Assume that the bank does whatever it takes in terms
of asset liquidation to avoid illiquidity-induced default. The total amount of liquidity that the
Θ
bank can generate through asset fire sales is Θ+1 . With full reliance on central bank lending,
the question was whether the related liquidity buffers would be sufficient. In the present
case, two default-triggering events need to be considered. Indeed, even if the bank has
survived a liquidity withdrawal, it may afterwards be assessed as insolvent and thus be
liquidated at the request of the bank supervisor. As noted above, for a given liquidity
1
withdrawal x, the fire sale related loss is Θ+1 𝑥 Θ+1 . The latter default event occurs if this loss
exceeds initial equity.4
Proposition 3.2. If δ = 0, an SNNR equilibrium exists if and only if:
(1−𝑡−𝑒)
2

Θ

1

≤ (Θ+1) and 𝑒 ≥ (Θ+1)

(1−𝑡−𝑒)Θ+1
2

The proposition can be verified by again establishing the strategic game payoffs and showing
under which circumstances the SNNR conditions are met. The proof has been provided
elsewhere (Bindseil 2013). In sum, to ensure financial stability in the case of absence of
central bank credit, minimum liquidity and capital buffers are needed in some appropriate
Note that it is assumed that equity is never sufficient to absorb the losses resulting from a bank default; that
is, it is assumed that e ≤ 1/(Θ + 1). Of course, one could also calculate through the opposite case, but it is omitted
here as it does not seem to match reality.
4
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combination to ensure the stability of a given amount of short-term funding. The lower the
asset liquidity, the lower the amount of short-term funding that can be sustained for a given
level of equity.

4.

Cases in Which the Banks Rely on Both Types of Liquidity
Buffers

Now we consider the cases in which both Θ, δ > 0. It is assumed that the ordering of assets is
the same for both forms of liquidity generation; that is, if asset i is subject to lower fire sale
discounts than asset j, then also asset i will have a lower central bank collateral haircut than
asset j. Proposition 4.1 narrows the actual range of mixed cases, or cases in which both
liquidity sources play a role in the planning of the bank.
Proposition 4.1. If either δ ≥ Θ, or both Θ > δ and δ/(δ + 1) ≥ (1- t- e)/2 are satisfied,
then banks will only rely on central bank credit to address possible deposit withdrawals,
and hence the conditions established in Proposition 3.1 apply to the existence of an
SNNR equilibrium.
Taking recourse to the central bank does not cause a loss, while fire sales cause one. If, in
addition, central bank recourse yields more liquidity (that is, δ > Θ), then central bank credit
strictly dominates asset fire sales as a source of emergency liquidity. If Θ > δ and central bank
liquidity buffers allow us to address liquidity outflows relating to one depositor, that is, δ/(δ
+ 1) (1- t- e)/2, which, as shown previously, allows us to sustain the SNNR equilibrium, then
again relying only on central bank credit dominates strategies that rely on both sources.
The cases in which the bank wants to rely potentially on both funding sources therefore
appear to be limited to the ones in which Θ > δ and (1- t - e)/2 > δ/(δ + 1). Again, a number of
cases have to be distinguished. There will generally be a trade-off between the maximum
liquidity generation and the ability to avoid losses, under the optimal use of the two funding
sources. For example, the maximum generation of liquidity is achieved through fire sales
only and will be equal to Θ/(1 + Θ). However, this also leads to the highest possible fire sales
losses and damage to equity, 1/(1 + Θ), and it is realistic to assume that this extent of losses
would exceed equity. Regardless, if all the assets of the bank are sold, it has ceased to exist.
The lowest generation of liquidity is achieved if all assets are pledged through central bank
credit, and in this case, liquidity generation is δ/(1 + δ) and fire sale losses are 0. Between
these two extreme pairs of liquidity generation and fire sale losses, the set of efficient
combinations of the two can be calculated. The following proposition addresses the question
of whether the bank’s strategy should foresee the need to fire sale the most liquid assets and
pledge the rest with the central bank, or the other way around.
Proposition 4.2. In funding strategies to address withdrawals of short-term deposits
rely on both funding sources, the bank should always foresee the need to fire sale the
most liquid assets and pledge the less liquid assets.
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The proof of this proposition is provided in Bindseil (2013). The proof relies on showing that
with the strategy to fire sale the most liquid assets and pledge the rest, the bank can achieve
combinations of liquidity generation and fire sale cost, which are always superior to the
combinations under the reverse strategy. The following Proposition 4.3 provides the
condition in the case of strategies relying on both funding sources for an SNNR equilibrium,
depending on the initial liability structure of the bank and the parameters Θ and δ.
Proposition 4.3. Let z ∈ [0, 1] determine which share of its assets is foreseen by the
bank to be used for fire sales (that is, the less liquid share 1 – z of assets is foreseen for
pledging with the central bank). Let k = h(z) be the fire sale losses from fire selling the z
most liquid assets and let y = f (z) be the total liquidity generated from fire selling the
most liquid assets z and from pledging the least liquid assets 1 − z. Then, an SNNR
equilibrium exists if and only if ∃z ∈ [0, 1], such that:
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑧) =

(1 − t − 𝑒)
𝛿
𝑧 𝛿+1
𝑧 Θ+1
+
−
≥
,
(𝛿 + 1) (𝛿 + 1) (Θ + 1)
2

𝑘=

𝑧 Θ+1
≤𝑒
Θ+1

The proof of this proposition is provided Bindseil (2013). Figure 3 illustrates the generation
of liquidity and fire sale losses under strategy z. The figure reflects that the bank plans to fire
sale the most liquid part of its assets z, and pledge with the central bank the least liquid part
of assets 1 − z. Therefore, total liquidity y that could be generated corresponds to the sum of
y1, the surface above the fire sale loss curve 𝑥 𝛩 up to z, and y2, the surface above the haircut
curve xδ, starting at z. Fire sale losses k will be equal to the surface below the fire sale loss
curve between 0 and z.
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Figure 4: Liquidity Generation and Fire Sale Losses If Most Liquid Assets (from 0 to z)
Are Sold, while Least Liquid Assets (from z to 1) Are Pledged with Central Bank

Source: Created by the authors.

5.

Stable Funding Structure with the Lowest Possible Cost

In the previous sections, it was assumed that the initial bank balance sheet was given and
the conditions for stability of short-term funding were established. It was shown that,
depending on the bank’s liability structure, the haircut δ, and asset liquidity Θ, short-term
bank funding was stable or not. This section makes the liability structure endogenous in a
simple setting. It is assumed that different liabilities require different remuneration rates
but are at these rates perfectly elastic. For given, deterministic δ and Θ, competing banks can
be assumed to choose the cheapest possible liability structure as determined by the
conditions in the strategic depositor game, such that the single no-run equilibrium applies.
Assume that the cost of remuneration of the three asset types are re for equity, rt for term
funding, and 0 for short term deposits. Also assume that re > rt > 0, and that Θ > δ. In this
setting, what will be the composition of the banks’ liabilities? The objective of the liability
structure will be to minimize the average funding cost subject to maintaining a stable shortterm funding basis.
•

One strategy could be to rely only on central bank credit and thus aim to have δ/(δ +
1) ≥ (1 – e – t)/2, such that fire sales will not be needed at all as backstop. If fire sales
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are not needed, then term funding is superior to equity and equity will be set to zero;
that is, liabilities will consist only in term funding t and short-term deposits s = 1 – t.
Therefore, the condition for stable short-term funding will be δ/(δ + 1) ≥ (1 t)/2,
which implies t∗ = 1 – 2δ/(δ + 1). The average remuneration rate of bank funding will
be t∗rt.
•

A second strategy would be to rely only on the fire sales approach but to hold the
necessary equity. This would mean that the two minimum conditions to be fulfilled
are z − zΘ/(1 +Θ) ≥ (1 − t − e)/2 and e ≥ (z(1+Θ)/(1 +Θ). The funding costs trt + ere can be
minimized subject to these two constraints to obtain a unique optimum t∗(Θ, re, rt)
and e∗(Θ, re, rt), to obtain the minimum average funding costs of the bank liabilities
t∗rt + e∗re. This case corresponds to δ = 0 in the following more general formulation.

•

A third, general strategy is to rely on both sources of funding, to plan to fire sell the
most liquid assets from 0 to z, and to pledge the least liquid assets from z to 1, as
described in Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 and in the following optimization problem.

Problem 5.1. Suppose a bank relies on both sources of liquidity. The general problem of
optimal liquidity management is to minimize through the choice of t, e, z ∈ [0, 1], with t
+ e ∈ [0, 1] the average remuneration rate of the banks’ liabilities t∗rt + e∗re, and with
parameters subject to the two constraints:
𝛿
𝑧𝛿 + 1
𝑧𝛩 + 1
(1 − 𝑡 − 𝑒)
+
+
≥
(𝛿 + 1) (𝛿 + 1) (𝛩 + 1)
2

(4)

𝑧 𝛩+1
𝑒 ≥
(𝛩 + 1)

(5)

We provide the mathematical solution to this optimization problem in the Appendix. Figure
4 illustrates the functional relationships among the given parameters (Θ, δ, re, rt), and the
optimum values of e∗, t∗, s∗, z∗, and r∗ (with s∗ =1 – e∗ – t∗ being the implied share of shortterm funding). Key findings are: the minimum bank intermediation cost r∗ falls
monotonously in Θ and in δ before reaching zero (Figure 4.a). Both the share of assets
foreseen for fire selling, z∗, and the equity ratio fall monotonously in δ, but both first increase
and then decrease again in Θ (unless δ is high enough to allow for z∗ = 0 and e∗ = 0) (Figure
4.b and 4.c). The share of long-term debt, t∗, falls monotonously in Θ and in δ before reaching
zero (Figure 4.d). The share of short-term deposits, s∗, increases monotonously in Θ and in δ
before reaching 100% (Figure 4.e).
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Figure 5: Minimum Funding Costs (r*), Cost-Minimizing Liquidity-Generating
Strategy (z), and Liability Mix (e*, t*, s*), as Functions of δ and Θ, for rt = 5%, re = 10%

a. Minimum bank intermediation cost r* as function
of θ and δ

b. Funding-cost minimizing share of assets foreseen
for fire sales, z*, as function of θ, δ

c. Funding-cost minimizing share of equity funding,
e*, as function of θ and δ

d. Funding-cost minimizing share of long-term
funding, t*, as function of θ and δ

e. Funding-cost minimizing share of short-term
funding, s*, as function of θ and δ
Source: Created by the authors.
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Figure 6.a shows how the liability mix minimizing the funding cost evolves as a function of
asset liquidity Θ, for given collateral liquidity δ = 0.2 (and again rt = 5%, re = 10%). It
illustrates that the optimal equity share is not a monotonous function of the asset liquidity
but reaches a maximum for about Θ = 0.9. In contrast, the optimal long- and short-term
funding shares decline monotonously with an improving asset liquidity (Figure 6.b shows
the same relations, but for δ = 0). Figure 6.c illustrates how the liability mix minimizing
funding cost evolves as function of the equity premium re, for a given term funding premium
rt = 2%, for given (Θ, δ) = (0.5, 0.2). The equity share e∗ falls monotonously in the equity
premium re, while the share of long-term debt t∗ increases monotonously in re. The share of
short-term funding s∗ also declines monotonously in re. Figure 6.d shows the same
relationships for δ = 0.
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Figure 6: Cheapest Stable Funding Mix (e*, t*, s*), Depending on Asset Liquidity,
Access to the Central Bank, and Relative Size of Equity Premium

a. (e*, t*, s*) as functions of Θ, for δ = 0.2;
rt = 5%, re = 10%. X-axis: value of Θ;
Y-axis: liability composition

b. (e*, t*, s*) as functions of Θ, for δ = 0;
rt = 5%; re = 10%. X-axis: value of Θ;
Y-axis: liability composition

c. (e*, t*, s*) as functions of re, for rt = 2%, d. (e*, t*, s*) as functions of r , for r = 2%,
e
t
and (Θ, δ) = (0.5, 0.2). X-axis: value of re;
and (Θ, δ) = (0.5, 0). X-axis: value of re;
Y-axis: liability composition
Y-axis: liability composition
Source: Created by the authors.

6.

The Central Bank Collateral Framework as a Policy Tool
Although the primary purpose of the central bank collateral framework is risk protection,
the observed collateral policy measures of central banks during the GFC and in 2020 raise
the question of what exactly the intentions of the central banks have been to widen collateral
availability (and hence potential central bank recourse), in particular in a context of
deteriorating asset liquidity. The model proposed in this paper allows interpreting the
relaxation of the collateral framework as a policy measure:
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(1) First, when Θ (asset liquidity) suddenly declines, increasing δ (by decreasing
haircuts and broadening collateral eligibility) is a way to preserve the no-run
equilibrium (the SNNR) and thereby is a necessary condition to prevent increases
in central bank reliance, fire sales, and/or defaults. In this sense, it benefits all banks
and financial stability in general, and not only those banks that already experience
a run. Moreover, it may be noted that the model provides support to Bagehot’s
“inertia principle,” according to which, the central bank should not tighten its
collateral framework in a financial crisis as a reaction to the deterioration of asset
liquidity: “If it is known that the Bank of England is freely advancing on what in
ordinary times is reckoned a good security—on what is then commonly pledged and
easily convertible—the alarm of the solvent merchants and bankers will be stayed .
. . ” (Bagehot 1873). Lowering δ when Θ declines anyway would mean decreasing
particularly strongly the amount of sustainable short-term funding and thereby
maximizing the probability of a destabilization of bank funding, contributing,
instead of preventing, large central bank recourse and fire sales of assets.
(2) Second, assuming that a deterioration of Θ can be anticipated as a crisis is building,
one could imagine that banks can adjust their liability structures in time. It would
come at a high cost because, in such a context, investors also will have a strong
preference for short-term assets and the collective attempt of all banks to increase
the maturity of their liabilities will therefore lead to a steep increase of bank funding
costs (and hence of bank lending rates). This would be procyclical, and an
adjustment of the collateral framework parameter δ could be seen as a policy tool
to prevent such a steep increase of funding costs.
(3) Third, although the effect described in the previous point could in theory also be
addressed by conventional monetary policy, that is, a lowering of central bank
interest rates, this has limits as far as the zero lower bound is reached (as it was the
case for most central banks in 2020). When this limit is reached, a widening of
collateral availability may become relevant as an alternative approach to lowering
effective bank funding costs or at least preventing their increase.
In the context of the model, assume that (Θ1, δ1) are the pre-crisis asset parameters and (for
a given equity and term funding premia rt, re) the minimum funding cost is r1∗ = r∗(Θ1, δ1),
and the related liability composition is e1* = e∗(Θ1, δ1), t1∗ = t∗(Θ1, δ1), s∗1 = s∗(Θ1, δ1). Assume
that a market liquidity crisis materializes with Θ shifting from Θ1 to Θ2 < Θ1. This implies that
r2∗ = r∗ (Θ2, δ1) > r1∗. Moreover, for (Θ2, δ1), the funding structure e∗1, t∗1, s∗1 does not allow for
a single no-run equilibrium, but the banks are now in the multiple equilibrium case in which
a bank run can occur. Now call δ2 the value of δ for which r∗(Θ2, δ2) = r1∗. In other words, and
assuming that the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound, the collateral
framework δ2 is the one that allows us to restore the monetary conditions (in the sense of
the bank funding costs, and thus the bank lending rates) that prevailed before the liquidity
crisis—however, only under the assumption that the banks can rapidly adjust their funding
structures toward e∗2 = e∗ (Θ2, δ2), t∗2 = t∗(Θ2, δ2), s∗2 = s∗(Θ2, δ2). Then, monetary conditions
and financial stability have been restored. Alternatively, the central bank may immediately
want to restore the single no-run equilibrium and not take the risk of a run in the possibly
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lengthy process of the adjustment of banks’ liability structures. This will require choosing
another value of δ, δ2. Call δ3 the collateral framework that is obviously sufficient to restore
immediately a no-run equilibrium, in the sense that e∗1 ≤ e∗(Θ2, δ3), t∗1 ≤ t∗(Θ2, δ3), s∗1 ≥ s∗(Θ2,
δ3). However, δ3 is not strictly necessary for restoring a single no-run equilibrium. Call δ4 the
smallest value of δ for which the funding structure (e∗1, t∗1, s∗1) implies a no-run equilibrium
for (Θ2, δ4), that is, for which the sufficient equity condition (5) and the sufficient liquidity
condition (4) are both fulfilled, whereby banks can of course recalibrate the parameter z
without any delay.
In what follows, we refer the reader to the example Figure 7, with rt = 5% and re = 10%.
Short-term funding costs are set at 0%, consistent with the idea that the zero lower bound is
constraining. Figure 7 shows, for these given funding cost parameters, how the optimum
values r∗, z∗, e∗, t∗, and s∗ depend on the asset fire sale liquidity parameter Θ and the collateral
framework parameter δ.
Assume that (Θ1, δ1) = (0.7, 0.2) and that the banks have chosen the cheapest sustainable
funding structures. Following Figure 7, we have (e∗1, t∗1, s∗1) = (67%, 15%, 19%), to obtain
funding costs of r1∗ = 2.5%. Let the crisis-related asset liquidity be Θ2 = 0.2. The table
indicates that δ2 = 0.4, as r∗(Θ2, δ2) = 2.2% ≤ r1∗. A more radical move by the central bank to
δ3 = 0.7 also obviously and immediately solves the issue of the bank run, as the optimal and
thus sustainable funding mix for (Θ2, δ3) = (0.2, 0.7) is less demanding for sure than the precrisis funding mix, since the table indicates that e∗1 ≤ e∗(Θ2, δ3), t∗1 ≤ t∗(Θ2, δ3), s∗1 ≥ s∗(Θ2, δ3).
Finally, one may check if δ = 0.6 or even δ = 0.5 would also ensure the fulfilment of the
sufficient equity and sufficient liquidity conditions (5) and (4). Note that for (Θ1, δ1), z∗ = 44%,
while for (Θ2, δ3), like for any (Θ, δ) with Θ ≤ δ, z∗ = 0. It turns out that the bank simply needs
to set z = 0 and both δ4 = 0.6 and δ4 = 0.5 become sufficient from a funding stability
perspective, while δ4 = 0.4 is indeed insufficient. Therefore, to immediately restore both an
accommodative monetary policy stance and financial stability, after the liquidity crisis (after
the deterioration of Θ from 0.7 to 0.2), the central bank in this case should move its collateral
framework δ from 0.2 to 0.5. If this would be too accommodating from the monetary policy
perspective, then the central bank could of course raise the short-term risk-free interest rate.
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Figure 7: Optimum Values of r*, s*, e*, t*, and z* for δ and θ Each Taking Values {0.1,
0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8}, in %, with rt = 5% and re = 10%
r* (minimum funding cost)
θ = 0.1
θ = 0.2
θ = 0.3
θ = 0.4
θ = 0.5
θ = 0.6
θ = 0.7
θ = 0.8
s* (short-term funding
ratio)
θ = 0.1
θ = 0.2
θ = 0.3
θ = 0.4
θ = 0.5
θ = 0.6
θ = 0.7
θ = 0.8
e* (equity ratio)
θ = 0.1
θ = 0.2
θ = 0.3
θ = 0.4
θ = 0.5
θ = 0.6
θ = 0.7
θ = 0.8
t* (long-term funding
ratio)
θ = 0.1
θ = 0.2
θ = 0.3
θ = 0.4
θ = 0.5
θ = 0.6
θ = 0.7
θ = 0.8
z* (assets for fire sales)
θ = 0.1
θ = 0.2
θ = 0.3
θ = 0.4
θ = 0.5
θ = 0.6
θ = 0.7
θ = 0.8

δ = 0.1 δ = 0.2
4,1%
3,3%
4,1%
3,3%
3,9%
3,3%
3,7%
3,2%
3,3%
3,0%
2,9%
2,7%
2,6%
2,4%
2,2%
2,1%
δ = 0.1 δ = 0.2

δ = 0.3
2,7%
2,8%
2,7%
2,7%
2,6%
2,4%
2,2%
1,9%
δ = 0.3

δ = 0.4 δ = 0.5 δ = 0.6 δ = 0.7
2,2%
1,7%
1,3%
0,9%
2,2%
1,7%
1,3%
0,9%
2,2%
1,7%
1,3%
0,9%
2,2%
1,7%
1,3%
0,9%
2,1%
1,7%
1,3%
0,9%
2,1%
1,7%
1,3%
0,9%
2,0%
1,6%
1,3%
0,9%
1,8%
1,5%
1,2%
0,9%
δ = 0.4 δ = 0.5 δ = 0.6 δ = 0.7

δ = 0.8
0,6%
0,6%
0,6%
0,6%
0,6%
0,6%
0,6%
0,6%
δ = 0.8

18%
33%
46%
57%
67%
75%
82%
89%
20%
33%
46%
57%
67%
75%
82%
89%
27%
34%
46%
57%
67%
75%
83%
89%
38%
40%
47%
57%
67%
75%
83%
89%
49%
49%
51%
58%
67%
75%
82%
89%
58%
58%
58%
61%
67%
75%
82%
89%
67%
67%
66%
67%
69%
75%
82%
89%
75%
74%
74%
74%
75%
77%
82%
89%
δ = 0.1 δ = 0.2 δ = 0.3 δ = 0.4 δ = 0.5 δ = 0.6 δ = 0.7 δ = 0.8
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
2%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
6%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
11%
4%
1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
15%
9%
3%
1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
17%
12%
7%
4%
0%
0%
0%
0%
19%
15%
11%
7%
2%
0%
0%
0%
20%
16%
13%
9%
5%
1%
0%
0%
δ = 0.1 δ = 0.2 δ = 0.3 δ = 0.4 δ = 0.5 δ = 0.6 δ = 0.7 δ = 0.8
82%
67%
78%
67%
68%
66%
51%
56%
37%
42%
24%
30%
14%
19%
5%
9%
δ = 0.1 δ = 0.2
0%
0%
5%
0%
13%
2%
26%
13%
36%
26%
44%
36%
51%
44%
56%
51%

54%
43%
33%
25%
18%
11%
54%
43%
33%
25%
18%
11%
54%
43%
33%
25%
17%
11%
53%
43%
33%
25%
17%
11%
46%
42%
33%
25%
18%
11%
34%
35%
33%
25%
18%
11%
23%
26%
29%
25%
18%
11%
13%
17%
20%
22%
17%
11%
δ = 0.3 δ = 0.4 δ = 0.5 δ = 0.6 δ = 0.7 δ = 0.8
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
3%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
13%
4%
0%
0%
0%
0%
26%
16%
4%
0%
0%
0%
36%
27%
13%
3%
0%
0%
44%
36%
26%
13%
3%
0%

Note: Numbers in gray fields are those referred to in text.
Source: Created by the authors.
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Conclusion

This paper provides a model of the role of the central bank collateral framework for the
LOLR, bank intermediation costs, banks’ optimal funding structure, and monetary policy at
the zero lower bound. Its innovation relative to the existing literature consists in specifying
asset liquidity and the collateral framework as continuous functions in the unit interval,
which allows building an integrated model encompassing all these dimensions and deriving
an analytical solution of this model. We have shown how broadening the collateral
framework, such as a number of central banks did in, for example, during the GFC and in
2020, can be considered to restore financial stability and adequate monetary conditions after
a negative asset liquidity shock. Bank asset liquidity and the central bank collateral
framework jointly determine financial stability and the ability of the banking system to
deliver maturity transformation, which is one of its key functions. The model also shows that
a widening of the central bank collateral set can prevent large recourse to central bank credit
by banks suffering from a deterioration of asset liquidity. In this sense, the paper provides
further illustration of Bagehot’s conjecture that only the “brave plan” of the 19th century
Bank of England would be a “safe” plan. In other words, by being “brave” and increasing δ
after an exogenous drop of Θ, the central bank will preserve the banks’ funding stability and
thereby minimize the recourse of stressed banks to its credit facilities, and hence be on the
“safe” side also in terms of financial exposures. The model also allows us to identify the
impact of asset liquidity and of the central bank collateral framework on funding costs of
banks and thereby on monetary policy conditions: first, policymakers need to be aware that
a tightening of any of the two emergency liquidity sources of banks needs to be, everything
else unchanged, compensated by a lowering of the monetary policy interest rate to maintain
unchanged funding costs of the real economy. Second, when the central bank has reached
the zero lower bound, and therefore cannot use standard interest rate policies any longer, it
can consider using its collateral framework to counteract a further increase of actual funding
costs of banks (and hence of the real economy depending on banks), which would otherwise
result from the deteriorated asset liquidity because of the implied more expensive funding
structure.
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Appendix: Solution to Problem 5.1

The problem we want to solve consists of minimizing the function 𝑟: (𝑡, 𝑒)
𝑟𝑡 𝑡 + 𝑟𝑒 𝑒 for given parameters 𝑟𝑒 ≥ 𝑟𝑡 , over the subspace of triples (𝑡, 𝑒, 𝑧) ∈ [0,1]3 , subject
to the following constraints:
𝛿

(1) 𝛿+1 +
(2) 𝑒 ≥

𝑧 𝛿+1
𝛿+1

−

𝑧Θ + 1
Θ+1

≥

(1−𝑡−𝑒)
2

𝑧Θ + 1
Θ+1

(3) 𝑡 + 𝑒 ≤ 1
where 𝛩 > 𝛿 ≥ 0 are given parameters.
Let 𝑊 ⊂ [0,1]3 be the domain of admissible triples (𝑡, 𝑒, 𝑧). Clearly, 𝑊 is a compact subspace
of 𝑅 3 ; therefore, 𝑟: 𝑊 → 𝑅 admits a minimum. Since the gradient ∇𝑟 = (𝑟𝑡 , 𝑟𝑒 , 0) is nonvanishing everywhere on 𝑊, the minimum point lies on the boundary 𝜕𝑊. We now analyze
the behavior of 𝑟 over a decomposition of such a boundary. Note that 𝜕𝑊 =∪5 𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖 , where
we set:
(1) 𝑊1 = {(𝑡, 𝑒, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑊: 𝑒 = 0, or 𝑡 = 0, or 𝑧 = 0}
(2) 𝑊2 = {(𝑡, 𝑒, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑊: 𝑒 = 1, or 𝑡 = 1, or 𝑧 = 1}
(3) 𝑊3 = {(𝑡, 𝑒, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑊: 𝑡 + 𝑒 = 1}
(4) 𝑊4 = {(𝑡, 𝑒, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑊: 𝑒 =
(5) 𝑊5 = {(𝑡, 𝑒, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑊:

𝛿

𝑧Θ + 1
Θ+1

+
𝛿+1

}

𝑧 𝛿+1
𝛿+1

−

𝑧Θ + 1
Θ+1

=

(1−𝑡−𝑒)
2

}

Let’s study 𝑟 on 𝑊1 . If 𝑒 = 0, then necessarily 𝑧 = 0, which implies:
𝛿
(1 − 𝑡)
≥
𝛿+1
2
1−𝛿

1−𝛿

If 𝛿 ≤ 1, we minimize W by choosing (𝑡 ∗ , 𝑒 ∗ , 𝑧 ∗ ) = 1+𝛿 , 0,0, which yields 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑟𝑡 1+𝛿. Note that
in this case, 𝑡 ≤ 1, and equality holds if and only if 𝛿 = 1. If instead 𝛿 > 1, then (𝑡 ∗ , 𝑒 ∗ , 𝑧 ∗ ) =
(0,0,0) is admissible, so we obtain 𝑟 ∗ = 0. From now on, we will assume 𝛿 < 1 to avoid the
trivial solution.
Suppose 𝑡 = 0, then we set 𝑒 =

𝑧Θ + 1
Θ+1

, subject to the condition:
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𝛿−1
𝑧 𝛿+1
𝑧Θ + 1
ℎ(𝑧) =
+2
−
≥0
𝛿+1
𝛿+1 Θ + 1
We have ℎ(0) < 0, ℎ(1) > 0, and ℎ′ (𝑧) > 0 for every 𝑧 ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, ∃! 𝑧 ∗ ∈ [0,1] with
𝑧Θ + 1

ℎ(𝑧 ∗ ) = 0. By construction, 𝑧 ∗ is the smallest value of 𝑧 for which 0, Θ + 1 , 𝑧 satisfies all
(𝑧 ∗ )Θ + 1

constraints. Thus, we get a candidate triple 0, Θ + 1 , 𝑧 ∗ , which yields 𝑟 ∗ = 𝑟𝑒
𝑧 = 0 can be reduced to an already analyzed case.

(𝑧 ∗ )Θ + 1
Θ+1

. Finally,

On 𝑊2 and 𝑊3 , it is easy to prove there is no better contribution from any possible
configuration. Turning to 𝑊4 , we have 𝑒 =
𝑡≥

𝑧Θ + 1
Θ+1

, and 𝑡 is subject to the constraint:

1 − 𝛿 𝑧Θ + 1
𝑧 𝛿+1
+
−2
= −ℎ(𝑧)
1+𝛿 Θ + 1
𝛿+1

To minimize, we set 𝑡 = −ℎ(𝑧), and we study 𝑟 = 𝜑(𝑧) = −𝑟𝑡 ℎ(𝑧) + 𝑟𝑒
𝜑 ′ (𝑧) = 0, we see that 𝜑 has a minimum at:

𝑧Θ + 1
Θ+1

. By solving

1

(2𝑟𝑡 )Θ−δ
𝑧̅ =
𝑟𝑡 + 𝑟𝑒
𝑧̅ Θ + 1

If ℎ(𝑧̅) ≤ 0, we have a new candidate triple (𝑡 ∗ , 𝑒 ∗ , 𝑧 ∗ ) = −ℎ(𝑧̅), Θ + 1 , 𝑧̅. Finally, the case of
𝑊5 can be reconducted to this last one, so the analysis is complete. The solution to the
original problem is obtained by comparing the two (or three, depending on the cases)
candidates selected by the algorithm we have just described.
Remark. If we fix 𝛿 and let Θ vary, we can observe that:
(1) 𝑧 ∗ (Θ) ≤ z ∗ (Θ′ ) if Θ > Θ′, where 𝑧 ∗ (Θ) denotes the unique solution to
𝑧Θ + 1
Θ+1

𝛿−1

𝑧 𝛿+1

+ 2 𝛿+1 −
𝛿+1

= 0 over [0,1]
1

(2) lim 𝑧(Θ) = 1, for 𝑧(Θ)=
Θ→+∞

(2𝑟𝑡 )Θ−δ
𝑟𝑡 +𝑟𝑒

Thus, for Θ − δ big enough, we obtain 𝑧̅(Θ) > z ∗ (Θ), which forces us to pick (𝑡 ∗ , 𝑒 ∗ , 𝑧 ∗ ) =
0,

𝑧 ∗ (Θ)
Θ+1

𝑧̅ Θ + 1

, 𝑧 ∗ (Θ) over (𝑡 ∗ , 𝑒 ∗ , 𝑧 ∗ ) = −ℎ(𝑧̅), Θ + 1 , 𝑧̅. On the other hand, for Θ close enough to 𝛿,
𝑧̅ Θ + 1

we have that (𝑡 ∗ , 𝑒 ∗ , 𝑧 ∗ ) = −ℎ(𝑧̅), Θ + 1 , 𝑧̅ is admissible, so that (𝑡 ∗ , 𝑒 ∗ , 𝑧 ∗ ) = 0,
longer runs among candidates for the minimization of 𝑟.
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